This study examines the Iran–Israel cyber rivalry through a constructivist lens, arguing that existing analyses underestimate the social and narrative logics that shape cyber conflict in Southwest Asia. While conventional approaches emphasize capabilities and deterrence, they often overlook how cyber operations acquire meaning through identity, discourse, and ontological security dynamics. Addressing this gap, the article shows that incidents such as the Stuxnet operation functioned as discursive turning points that reinforced Iran’s pre existing self perception as an active cyber actor and intensified a long standing rivalry rather than transforming its identity. Drawing on qualitative analysis of official statements, policy documents, and public narratives from 2010 to 2024, the study finds that ambiguous cyber norms enable both actors to interpret operations as challenges to implicit red lines, producing cycles of reciprocal action and narrative escalation. These patterns extend competition into domains of symbolic signaling, perception management, and the strategic production of ontological insecurity. The article contributes to cybersecurity scholarship by demonstrating how identities and social meanings structure cyber interactions, and by highlighting the need for trust building measures and norm development mechanisms to mitigate spiraling instability in the region.