The role of Shiite forces in the politics of Iraq after Saddam (with emphasis on Nouri al-Maliki era)

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Mazandaran University/ International Relations

2 PhD in International Relations/Tehran University

Abstract

Iraq is an important country in the neighborhood of Iran, it has a mosaic texture that includes many tribes and ethnicities. The majority of the country's population is made up of Shias, who could not play a role due to the dominance of the Sunni Baath Party. After the fall of Saddam by the American forces, we have seen fundamental changes in this country. Among these is the position of different groups in the context of decision-making in Iraq. Although sectarianism is still the most important cause of unrest in the country, but due to the fact that the former forces are no longer in power, the grounds for the presence of Shiites in this country have been provided. According to the understanding of this matter and the change in the situation, this article intends to answer the question, what role did the fall of Saddam play in the situation of Shiites gaining power in Iraq during Nouri al-Maliki's era? The hypothesis of this article is that the fall of Saddam led the Shiites to come out of isolation, the role of authority and guidance of the Iraqi Shiites in the affairs of the country became stronger, the presence in the country's important parties and holding the most important government positions, playing a role in the country's security force in the form of Hashd al-Shaabi. It is the subject of the article. The article examines the assumptions by descriptive-analytical method and library compilation.

Keywords


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